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DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT  
IN THE OIL MARKET OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION:  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1
The purpose of this research is the assessment of the competitive environment in the Russian oil market. 
The subject-matter of the study is the Russian oil and gas companies as a basis of the Energy market. We 
check the hypothesis about the development of the mechanism of corrective condition in the sphere of pre-
liminary control of market concentrations in the fuel and energy complex (FEC). The basis of this research is 
the modern theory of industry markets studying various structures of the markets, the behavior of their par-
ticipants, probable consequences of their functioning and interaction, as well as the impact of the state on 
the functioning of markets, its participants, and the results of their activities. We calculated and analyzed the 
key indicators characterizing the processes of market concentration in the oil industry. We also considered 
the competition policy of the Russian Federation in mergers and acquisitions deals (M&A deals) concern-
ing oil and gas assets. The authors estimated over 460 decisions made by the Federal Antimonopoly Service 
of the Russian Federation for the period from 2011 to 2015 in the control on economic concentration in fu-
el-and-energy industry. Based on the data characterizing the development of competitive environment, we 
have proved that the considered goods market belongs to markets with insufficiently developed competition. 
The results of the research will make a certain contribution to studying the efficiency of M&A transactions 
in the oil and gas industry, and also can be applied for the implementation of anti-monopoly actions by the 
Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation.
Keywords: oil companies, gas companies, mergers, acquisitions, index of concentration of the first n firms, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, antimonopoly policy, behavioral instructions, structural instructions
Introduction
The competitive environment in the Russian 
Federation began to form in the conditions of 
the refusal of the methods of the planned econ-
omy by business entities. Reforms of the last dec-
ade of the XX centuries proclaimed the transition 
to market economy. However, new institutes and 
processes were reproduced for quite a long time. 
It constrained the development of the market re-
lations, determining both the state and business 
actions up to the beginning of the 2000th. Among 
the main features of business in the period of the 
transitional economy of the Russian Federation, 
it is possible to note its criminal nature (includ-
ing raiding), legal nihilism, the drive to the market 
power and abnormal profit for short terms, injuri-
ous resource consumption. 
The companies’ incentives for the formation of 
the production and managerial innovations nec-
essary for the creation of comparative competitive 
1 © Chernova E. G., Razmanova S. V. Text. 2018.
advantages were at a low level at that time. The 
existing scheme of redistribution of the main fi-
nancial resources through the government budget 
and control over prices of products and services of 
natural monopolies distorted the functioning of a 
market mechanism. 
The report of Audit Chamber gives expert eval-
uations concerning the results of privatization 2, it 
says that in Russia «there is the highest level of 
concentration of private property in the world. 
That is there is a situation which slows down the 
processes of achievement of competitiveness of 
the Russian economy. The small and average own-
ers and entrepreneurs, being in the developed 
democratic states a driving force of economic de-
2 Analiz protsessov privatizatsii gosudarstvennoy sobstven-
nosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za period 1993–2003 gody [The 
analysis of privatization processes of state-owned property 
in the Russian Federation for the period 1993–2003]. (2004). 
Moscow: Olita Publ. Retrieved from:http://nationalization.ru/
Library/aHAJIu3_C4eTHOu_nAJIATbIdf.pdf (date of access: 
06.07.2017).
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velopment and support of political stability, have 
not taken place in Russia». 
Privatization and a considerable degree of pro-
duction concentration in many respects explain 
the processes of mergers and acquisitions in the 
Oil and Gas industry taking place in the second 
half of the 1990th, and the beginning of the 2000th 
years. The change of owners during the post-pri-
vatization period can be connected with processes 
of transition of corporate control. Such transition 
was, as a rule, in the form of sale of packets of vot-
ing shares between the groups of persons whose 
affiliation was not evident for the external ob-
server, owing to the lack of proper transparency 
of the vast majority of the companies. At the same 
time, in the current conditions, the change of an 
owner of a company as a result of integration pro-
cesses can be connected to the structural changes 
and the growth of its efficiency.
As a rule, the competitive situation is consid-
ered by the analysis of the various types of mar-
ket structures, from the point of view of the size 
of business or in an industry view. In foreign and 
domestic scientific works studying of theoreti-
cal and applied aspects of competition policy and 
anti-monopoly regulation, the development of 
the ideas of its structure and tools is provided by 
Bain J. S., Sherer F. M. and Ross D.; Sheferd A. and 
Sheferd D.; Duso T., Gugler K., Szücs F.; Nocke V., 
Whinston M.; Thomasin S.; Mason R., Weeds H.; 
Breinlich H., Schutz N.; Avdasheva S. B.; Roza- 
nova E. A.; Pakhomova N. V. and Richter K. K.; 
Kapelyushnikova R. I.; Draft E. G.; Quickly I. P.; 
Shastitko A. E., etc. [1–10]. In the analysis of com-
petitive situation, researchers focus on the inten-
sity of the competition and the nature of its devel-
opment, operating with the following parameters: 
barriers on an entrance/exit for/from the mar-
ket, the concentration level of factors influencing 
the offer (a cost structure, geographical, product 
boundaries of the market) and demand (elastic-
ity of demand, product quality, its differentiation), 
transparency and efficiency of the competitive 
legislation [11–13]. Information on concentration 
in the certain industrial markets is generalized by 
the means of calculation and analysis of a number 
of indices of concentration. Among the indices, it 
should be noted an index of concentration of the 
first n firms; Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index; 
Gini coefficient; index of entropy; and Lerner’s 
index.
In the scientific literature, there are various 
approaches to the analysis of competitive or mar-
ket environment, market structures and competi-
tive processes. This perspective is studied in detail 
within the economy of the industrial markets with 
an allocation of the key determining parameters 
mentioned-above. And it partly finds the applica-
tion in current domestic anti-monopoly regula-
tion when implementing the competition policy. 
At the same time, there is a deficit of applied re-
searchers on a number of separate key industries. 
For example, the modern national oil industry is 
the oligopolistic market. There have been the ac-
tive processes of concentration for the last dec-
ades. Can this industry be in a competitive line? 
Can we talk about the effective regulation of oil 
industry, especially concerning the tendency of 
transition under the State control? 
During this research, we check the hypothe-
sis of the development of the mechanism in the 
sphere of preliminary control of market concen-
tration deals preliminary control in the fuel and 
energy complex (FEC).
The authors designated the existing barriers to 
enter to the market of crude oil, and also produc-
tive and geographical boundaries of the market. 
In this research, we considered some aspects of 
Russian competition policy, anti-monopoly regu-
lation, and control of market concentration.
1. Research Methodology
Methodological basis of the research is the 
current theory of industrial markets. Within the 
theory, the main factors determining the market 
structure are the following: a number of produc-
ers, their concentration ratio, distribution of mar-
ket shares, extent of vertical integration within 
the value chain; economic indications of prod-
ucts (quality, extent of differentiation, proxim-
ity to substitutes); cost structure of companies 
(economies of scale, network benefits, subadditiv-
ity); barriers of an entrance and an exit from the 
market, the extra expenses; security with infor-
mation; concentration and market power of buy-
ers; the conditions determining the sales demand 
(trends, cyclic and seasonal fluctuations).
Market concentration is a measure of inten-
sity either the competition or a control indica-
tor over the market. Its market share can serve as 
the measuring instrument of the size of a com-
pany. The following indices for determining the 
market concentration are the most known: in-
dex of concentration of the first n firms (CRn) and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Also, for the 
mergers deals must use the data of the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation 
concerning Oil and Gas companies assets.
The majority of researchers [14, pp. 596–
619; 15, pp. 1200–1251; 16, pp. 1201–1251; 17, 
pp. 1003–1033; 18, pp. 391–401; 19, pp. 1114–
1144; 20, pp. 1019–1041; 21, pp. 277–319] ana-
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lyze the efficiency of competitiveness at the in-
dustrial markets from the point of view of the 
policy of antimonopoly authorities concern-
ing to horizontal mergers, correction of the of-
fered mergers or prohibition of non-competitive 
mergers. Furthermore, they analyse the factors 
able to break decisions in the field of merger con-
trol»one-way» effects in horizontal mergers, es-
pecially in the differentiated goods markets. In 
some papers [22, pp. 23–38; 23], there is analyzed 
the optimization policy of antimonopoly author-
ity, which is out of control for maximizing the ex-
pected consumer profit, oblige more tough stand-
ards on large merges, where take part firms, which 
occupied a big share of the market before the 
merge.
2. Assessment of the Competitive 
Environment in the Oil Market
The main Federal law in the Russian Federation 
concerning the maintenance and development of 
the competition is the Federal law of 26.07.2006 
No. 135-FZ «About the competition protection». 
Before accepted this law, since 1991, various ver-
sions of the RSFSR Law were accepted (22.03.1991 
No. 948–1 «About the competition and restric-
tion on monopolistic activities concerning prod-
ucts markets”; and since 1999, the Federal law of 
23.06.1999 No. 117-FZ «About the protection of 
competition on the market of financial services»).
According to the Competition Law of the 
Russian Federation, it is forbidden the market 
abuse (for example, in the form of establishment 
of monopoly prices, tying the contract conditions 
or the restriction for the access to the market), in-
cluding the holders of natural monopoly. It is also 
forbidden to make anti-competitive agreements 
engage in concerted action). For the authorities, 
it is forbidden to provide privileges and benefits 
to certain companies. Competitive requirements 
for the tenders and auction at the implementation 
of state procurements are established; the unfair 
competition is forbidden. 
Statistics of M&A confirms the dynamics of 
the concentration processes in the Russian econ-
omy. The data of reports of the KPMG company for 
2012 demonstrate that in case of a small number 
of M&A deals in an oil-and-gas sector (10,7 per-
cent from their total quantity in 2012) cost value is 
50,5 % of a total cost of M&A in the Russian econ-
omy. 1 Following the results of 2015, the above-
stated sizes are 8,7 and 27,9 % respectively. Such 
1 The market of M&A in Russia in 2012. (2013). Moscow: 
KPMG. Retrieved from: https://www.kpmg.com/RU/ru/
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/S_
MA_2r%202013.pdf (date of access: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
statistics, emphasizing the activity of the con-
centration processes in the oil sector, also pay at-
tention to the high cost of oil and gas assets con-
cerning the total assets of the Russian companies. 
Activity in the market of M&A in 2015 signifi-
cantly decreased till 504 transactions (against 623 
transactions in 2014). 
However, problems with liquidity led to the re-
duction in the number of large deals (over 2 bil-
lion US dollars), which historically were a factor 
for the growth of the Russian M&A market. Thus 
in 2015, only four mergers of such scale were an-
nounced (in 2013 — 14). At the same time, in a seg-
ment of small mergers, the activity has increased: 
the number of merges for less than 100 million US 
dollars increased by 1,8 times till 185 transactions 
(in 2013 — 104 transactions). 2 
Data on the dynamics of oil extraction by the 
Russian companies during the period from 2004 
to 2015 (tab. 1) 3 allowed to determine the indica-
tors of a market share (S) and a square of market 
share (S2) used further when calculating the mar-
ket concentration index. 
We have considered mainly the market of crude 
oil, so, it should be noted that sellers in the re-
searched market are the oil companies to carry 
out oil extraction, and buyers — the companies 
2 Russian M&A review 2015. (2016). Moscow: KPMG, 32. 
Retrieved from: https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/
pdf/2016/03/ru-en-russian-ma-review-2015.pdf (date of ac-
cess: 15.11.2016).
3 Oil extraction of Russian companies (2005). Energy industry 
of Russia: Results of productive activity of industries for 2004. 
Moscow: 1. 3–7. (In Russ.); Oil extraction of Russian compa-
nies. (2006). Energy industry of Russia: Results of productive 
activity of industries in December and since the beginning of 
2005. Moscow, 1, 2–8. (In Russ.); Oil extraction of Russian com-
panies (2007). MINTOP: Results of productive activity of in-
dustries of energy industry in December and since the begin-
ning of 2006. Moscow: 1. 22–27. (In Russ.); Oil extraction of 
Russian companies (2008). MINTOP: Results of productive ac-
tivity of industries of energy industry in January-December, 
2007. Moscow, 1. 22–27. (In Russ.); Oil extraction of Russian 
companies. (2009). MINTOP: Results of productive activity of 
industries of energy industry for 2008. Moscow, 1, 22–27 (In 
Russ.).; Oil extraction of Russian companies (2010). MINTOP: 
Results of productive activity of industries of energy industry 
for January-December, 2009. Moscow, 1. 22–29.; Oil-and-gas 
and oil-processing industry (2011). Energy industry of Russia. 
Moscow, 1. 2–7. (In Russ.); Oil-and-gas and oil-processing in-
dustry (2012). Energy industry of Russia. Moscow, 1, 2–7. (In 
Russ.); Oil-and-gas and oil-processing industry (2013). Energy 
industry of Russia. Moscow, 2, 2–7. (In Russ.); Oil-and-gas and 
oil-processing industry. Energy industry of Russia, 2, 2–7. (In 
Russ.); Oil and gas extraction in December, 2014 (2015). Oil and 
the equity. Moscow: Oil and Equity publishing House, 2, 56–59. 
(In Russ.); Oil and gas extraction in November-December, 2015 
(2016). Oil and the equity. Moscow: Oil and Equity publishing 
House, 1–2, 57–64. (In Russ.)
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purchasing crude oil for resale or performing its 
conversion (the petrochemical and oil processing 
companies).
The structure of the Russian oil sector express 
oligopolistic nature and is characterized by the 
vertically integrated oil companies (VIOC), which 
carry out activities on all segments of the market: 
production and oil refining, storage, wholesale, 
small wholesale and retail sale of oil products.
For the characteristic of the concentration of 
the oil market, we must address indices of the con-
centration of the first n firms (CRn) and HHI. We 
should note that the concentration is a measure of 
the intensity of the competition or an indicator of 
control over the market. Its market share can serve 
as the measuring instrument of the relative size of 
a company. 
For the Russian oil industry (tab. 2), the cal-
culated value of indices of the concentration of 
the first 4 firms (CR4) did not exceed 80 %. It says 
about the average degree of concentration of the 
market.
It should be noted that the market shares of the 
oil companies Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegas and 
TNK — BP participated in the calculation of the 
CR4 index in 2004. The CR8 index for 2004 also in-
cluded the oil companies Rosneft, Sibneft (subse-
quently Gazpromneft), Tatneft and Slavneft. Since 
2005, the Yukos and Rosneft companies made the 
redistribution. As a result, Rosneft has become 
one of four leading Russian Oil companies. The 
Yukos company in terms of production was among 
the first eight companies of the industry, but since 
2007 finally closed. The Russneft company partic-
ipated in the calculation of the CR8 index in 2007 
–2009. Since 2010, Bashneft was among first 8 oil 
companies instead of Russneft. After the transfer 
of assets of TNK–BP to JSC Rosneft, according to 
the results of production in 2013–2015, Rosneft, 
Lukoil, Surgutneftegas and Gazpromneft compa-
nies are included in the CR4 index. The CR8 index 
is added with the Tatneft, Bashneft, Slavneft and 
Gazprom companies.
During the period from 2004 to 2015, for the 
Oil industry, the HHI value increased from 1251 
up to 1865, whereas the number of equivalence 
decreased from 8,0 to 5,4 units (fig. 1 and fig. 2). 
That demonstrates that concentration degree in 
an oil sector approached critical value 2000 be-
hind which it should be considered as the market 
with the high level of concentration.
At the same time, according to the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service (FAS) of the Russian 
Federation in 2013, the value of the HHI and CR4 
indices made 2001,9 units and 77,6 %, respec-
tively 1. According to the results of 2013, FAS char-
acterizes the market of crude oil as a high-concen-
trated one.
It is considered, that industries with the high-
est coefficients of concentration also have the 
highest rates of the level of production of innova-
tive products.
At the same time, the share of technologi-
cal innovations at the companies relating to the 
sphere of energy production did not changed 
much. For example, in 2006, the level of techno-
logical innovations in energy sector constituted 
8,0 %, in 2012 and 2014 were 8,3 % and 7,4 %, re-
spectively. 2 The average value of an intensity of 
technological costs, marketing, and organiza-
tional innovations in the mining industry for the 
organizations more than 10000 people consti-
tuted 2,0 % that corresponds to the level of the 
industry, which has an average technological lev-
el. 3 However, if to address the ratio of the costs 
for the Research and Development to oil and gas 
companies revenue, this ratio will hardly exceed 
0,9 %. Thus, the increase in the level of merger 
control deals of the oil sector practically does not 
imply the innovative activities of these compa-
nies. It can be explained by the fact that nature of 
interrelation between the competition and inno-
vation very strongly depends on the institutional 
1 The analytical report on competitive situation analysis results 
in the market of crude oil for 2013. (2013). Moscow: Federal an-
timonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.gov.ru/an-
alytical-materials/analytical-materials_31102.html (date of ac-
cess: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
2 Indicators of innovative activities: 2009: / Statistical collection 
/ N.V. Gorodnikova, L. M. Gokhberg, K. A. Ditkovsky, etc. — 
M.: Higher School of Economics National Research University. 
— 2009. — 488 pages; Indicators of innovative activities: 2016: 
/ Statistical collection / N. V. Gorodnikova, L. M. Gokhberg, 
K. A. Ditkovsky, etc. — M.: Higher School of Economics 
National Research University. — 2016. — 320 pages.
3 Ibid, p. 77.
Table 2
The calculated value of the index of concentration of the first n firms in oil sector
Name of index 
Value of an indicator, unit
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
CR4 0,653 0,642 0,646 0,683 0,685 0,684 0,657 0,652 0,649 0,713 0,707 0.694
CR8 0,877 0,868 0,861 0,873 0,870 0,861 0,834 0,827 0,826 0,857 0,853 0.843
Source: it is calculated on the data of tab. 1.
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features of the Russian economy, as well as the 
structure of the oil and gas market. 
During 2004–2015, there is the tendency of the 
further growth of economic concentration among 
the largest companies of the industry, as well as 
the increase of the State companies in the oil mar-
kets. It is also necessary to note that the reduction 
of the extracted oil by independent mining com-
panies concerning their integration into the struc-
ture of Vertically Integrated Oil Company stopped 
near 2000th. 
In the report of FAS 1, it is noted that from 1998 
to 2007 the amount of production of small oil en-
terprises decreased twice — from 10 % of total 
amount to 5 %. Indeed, if to consider the market 
share of the independent companies (tab. 2), then, 
for example, in 2004 it constituted only 4,1 %, and 
1 The report on a competitive situation in the Russian Federation. 
(2008). Moscow: Federal antimonopoly service. Retrieved from: 
http://fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-reports/list-of-reports_9.html 
(date of access: 17.07.2016).
in 2005 — 3,4 % that represents the minimum 
value over the last ten years. Since 2006, the mar-
ket share of independent oil producers has been 
increasing. In 2007 and 2008 resulted 4,4 % and 
5,2 %, respectively. As the results of 2015, the 
amount of production of small oil enterprises 
made 10,6 % (the same as in 1998) despite all 
mergers and acquisitions happening in the oil in-
dustry in the last 15 years.
The existing level of economic concentration 
and the vertical integration cause the main bar-
riers to the entrance and implementation of prof-
itable activities in the markets of crude oil and oil 
products.
The governmental restrictions to enter the oil 
market are the following: the need to obtain li-
censes, environmental constraints, the need to 
achieve results at the hard geological and weather 
conditions, the use of innovative technologies ac-



















Source: it is calculated on tab. 1





























Source: it is calculated on the data of tab. 1
Fig. 2. Dynamics of the number of equivalence in the oil sector in 2004–2015
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Another barrier to entry the market are the 
limited number of refining facilities and limited 
capacity to use pipeline service of JSC Transneft 
system, as well as the existence of Vertically 
Integrated Oil Companies, which possess more 
than 70 % of capacities on processing of crude oil. 1
Vertically Integrated Oil Companies (VINK) 
dominate at the market of crude oil and down-
stream operation: following the results of 2015, 
more than 69,37 % of oil in the Russian Federation 
are extracted by four large VINK (Rosneft, Lukoil, 
Surgutneftegas, Gazprom Neft). More than 68,0 % 
of the Russian oil is processed at the plants con-
trolled by this VINK. 2 Each of the designated VINK 
holds a dominant position in the market of crude 
oil and, besides, has an additional opportunity to 
make an essential impact on the main conditions 
of the buy-sell of goods in the oil market. The sizes 
of shares of other vertically integrated oil compa-
nies during the long period (for a year) are subject 
to insignificant changes. Access to the market of 
crude oil in the Russian Federation for new com-
petitors is complicated. Thus, the comparison and 
analysis of the quantitative and qualitative indi-
ces characterizing the market of crude oil allows 
to draw the following conclusion: the Russia oil 
market belongs to the market with insufficiently 
developed competition.
As a result of the monitoring of the conditions 
of wholesale and retail oil markets and the level 
of oil price made by FAS and by its territorial au-
thorities in 2007–2015, the violations have been 
revealed from a number of VINK (Gazprom Neft, 
TNK-BP Holding, Rosneft and Lukoil). They were 
expressed in the establishment of exclusively high 
prices of oil products; creation of discrimination 
conditions for buyers; establishment of unreason-
able prices for oil products through economical 
and technologic conditions.
All decisions and instructions of FAS formed 
the basis of three «waves» of violation cases of the 
antitrust law by the largest vertically integrated 
oil companies. Following the results of a so-
called third wave by the Resolution of Presidium 
of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian 
Federation, it was established that geograph-
ical boundaries of the goods market of oil prod-
ucts are the territory of the Russian Federation. It 
was also recognized the corporate domination of 
1 The analytical report on competitive situation analysis results 
in the market of crude oil for 2013. (2013). Moscow: Federal an-
timonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://www.fas.gov.ru/an-
alytical-materials/analytical-materials_31102.html (date of ac-
cess: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
2 The market for oil products and natural gas in Russia. Results 
of 2015. (2016). Moscow: Algorithm Publ., 16. (In Russ).
Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft and TNK-BP com-
panies. Also, it was determined that product bor-
ders of the wholesale markets of oil products are 
automobile types of gasoline, diesel fuel, and avi-
ation kerosene because of these goods cannot be 
replaced in the case of consumption. 3
Nowadays, in the wholesale market, a con-
sumer (an independent trader) does not purchase 
at an inflated price light oil products at nearby oil 
refinery. He purchases goods at distant oil refin-
eries but at the effective price. From all oil refin-
eries, fuel oil and diesel fuel are also exported to 
the overwhelming number of regions of the coun-
try. Thus, transportation expenses are not a re-
straining factor for deliveries to the market. In 
the national oil wholesale market, the change of 
the consumption conditions in one place leads to 
a change of cargo flows in the market, in general. 
Similarly in the world markets: the change of sales 
terms in one of the leading centers of trade (ARA, 
MED or SING) leads to the change of the general 
terms of sales. Fuel from the Russian Federation is 
exported at the world prices, which impact on the 
Russia domestic market taking into account pro-
tective measures. 4 
Besides, FAS has also carried out monitoring 
of three basic indices of market prices: stock ex-
change quotations on oil and the main oil prod-
ucts, curb prices on oil and the main oil products, 
the comparable prices of the foreign markets.
It should be noted that the oil world pricing 
system, both in exchange and off-exchange seg-
ments, is constructed on the price indices pub-
lished by the PLATTS and ARGUS, agencies which 
acquired long statistics regarding dynamics of the 
price. World trade in oil products, derivatives, a 
system of the taxation, etc. is built on this data. 
However, these price indices are created by the 
private companies’ own methods. There are no 
procedures for internal and external control guar-
anteeing their justification, selection of data on 
deals is not representative one.
Nowadays, the practice of the Russian 
Federation is much better than before. According to 
the trade results of 2015, on the Russian exchange 
platform of CJSC St. Petersburg International 
Commodity Exchange, more than 15,9 million 
tons of oil products were sold. If the world agen-
3 Golomolzin, A. N. (2013). Anti-monopoly regulation of en-
ergy industry: 2010–2012: Presentation. (2013). Moscow: 
Federal antimonopoly service. Retrived from: http://chel.fas.
gov.ru/analytic/6644 (date of access: 07.2016). (In Russ.)
4 Some results of activities of FAS of 2004–2012: Report. (2013). 
Moscow: Federal antimonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://
fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-reports/list-of-reports_30067.html 
(date of access: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
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cies use own procedures of selective «reporting» 
transaction prices, then in Russia, the procedure 
of registration of total actual transactions by an 
amount more than 119 million tons is applied. 
That is in 10 times bigger, than the world agencies 
use. Exchange auction corresponds to the rules of 
the antitrust law and to the legislation on the or-
ganized auctions. The registration of transactions 
is obligatory according to the Russia Government 
Acts and the code of the Russian Federation about 
administrative violations. Thus, Russian esti-
mates are more reasonable, representative and re-
liable these days.
Undertaken measures allowed to create in the 
Russian Federation the commercial infrastructure 
of the market of oil and oil products, stock ex-
change trading by an available good is under de-
velopment, and also it is recorded ОТС (over the 
counter deal) at the Stock Market. Thereby, we have 
obtained the right information about the market 
of oil products. Now, in the Russian Federation 
ОТС in Rubbles for oil products begin to be con-
cluded. Addition activities on forming the basic 
conditions for the creation of the Russian price in-
dicators on benchmark crude are held.
3. Competition Policy of the Russian 
Federation in M&A of Oil and Gas Assets
Regulation of M&A deals in the Russian 
Federation is based on the Federal law of 
26.07.2006 No. 135-FZ «About protection the 
competition «. Management of transactions im-
plies the control of economic concentration in the 
Russia market, which is controlled by the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation. 
During 2004–2012, at the initiative of the 
Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian 
Federation, the antitrust legislation was upgraded. 
It significantly improved quality of the legislation 
valid from 1991; to unify the Russian antitrust 
law with the best samples of the European and 
American antitrust law; to remove excess barriers 
to business; to give to antimonopoly authority ad-
ditional powers to against monopolim in the mar-
ket and noncompetitive actions of authorities for 
the purpose of enhancement of law-enforcement 
practice. «The first antimonopoly packet» of laws 
was accepted in 2006 and unified two earlier act-
ing laws «About the Competition and Restriction 
of Monopolistic Activities in the Goods Markets» 
and «About Protection of the Competition in the 
Market of Financial Services». 1
1 Some results of activities of FAS of 2004–2012: Report. (2013). 
Moscow: Federal antimonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://
fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-reports/list-of-reports_30067.html 
(date of access: 17.07.2015). (In Russ.)
In 2009, «the second antimonopoly packet» of 
laws came into force and specified a conceptual 
framework (in particular, determination of «the 
monopoly price of goods»); strengthened control 
for anti-competitive actions of authorities’; up-
dated the principles for control of market concen-
tration (for example, there is appeared the require-
ment about disclosure of the final beneficiary); in-
creased threshold values of the organizations as-
sets. With the change of the 178th article of the 
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, there 
is appeared the real criminal sanction for an an-
titrust violation (up to 7 years of imprisonment).
The «Third anti-monopoly packet» of laws, 
which came into force in January 2012 carried 
specifying and in many respects liberal nature. In 
particular, it specified requirements to anti-com-
petitive agreements and coordinated actions; 
specified an order on the provision of the state-
owned and municipal property; fixed an adminis-
trative order of appeal of trading results; entered 
the mechanism of “warning” of antitrust viola-
tions; determined the circumstances of mitigating 
and aggravating responsibility, etc.
As a preventive measure, some M&A deals can 
be carried out after agreement of antimonopoly 
authorities. The changes in the area of the state 
control of economic integration connected with 
acceptance of «the first and second antimonopoly 
laws packet» can be seen in Table 3.
Reforms in field of control of market concentra-
tioin occurred not only in Russia. In the European 
Union, for example, the consideration of M&A 
deals are made according to the EU Directions or 
mergers (last change of Directives was in 2004). 
The monitoring authority making decisions on 
market concentration is the management of 
European Commission on competition issues. 
Foreign researchers [14, pp. 596–619] esti-
mated over 350 company M&A deals approved by 
the European Commission and the main legislative 
reform entered in 2004, having covered the period 
of 1990 — 2007. Results of their research show that 
because of the supervision of mergers and char-
acteristics of companies, it is possible to unmis-
takably predict the results of about 70 % of merg-
ers. Legislation reform of 2004 increased this per-
cent to 76 %. But researchers note that in spite of 
the fact that legislation reform of 2004 increased 
«policy predictability and reduced the quantity of 
mistakes», in the EU, there are still many opportu-
nities to prevent the noncompetitive mergers able 
harm the consumer.»
Within the control on market concentration, 
Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian 
Federation makes the following decisions: 
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1. About satisfaction of petition on merger deal 
if this deal does not lead to restriction of competi-
tion at the market.
2. About prolongation of the term of consider-
ation of the petition no more than for two months 
due to the need of its additional consideration, 
and also the receipt of the additional information 
if it is established that the merger deal declared in 
the petition can lead to the restriction competi-
tion. In this case, data of merger deal are posted on 
the official website of the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service, and persons, who have interested in this 
deal, have the right to provide data about influ-
ence on a competitive situation of this merger. 
3. About prolongation of the term of consider-
ation of the petition on merge, acquisitions, cre-
ation of commercial organization because of the 
need to define conditions, Once the applicants 
have met these conditions, FAS approve petition 
decides on the satisfaction of the petition, and 
determination of the term of accomplishment of 
such conditions (no more than nine months). 1 
1 A. N. Golomolzin (2013). Anti-monopoly regulation of en-
ergy industry: 2010–2012: Presentation. Moscow: Federal an-
timonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://chel.fas.gov.ru/ana-
lytic/6644 (date of access: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
Federal Antimonopoly Service coordinate a 
significant number of M&A with oil and gas as-
sets. The analysis of data FAS base on decisions 
in the field of economic concentration in the en-
ergy industry sphere (according to transactions 
with oil and gas assets) which are under author-
ity of management on control in the field of en-
ergy industry, during the period from 2011 until 
the first half of the year 2015, allowed to analyze 
468 merger deals. Thus, in 2013, 111 transactions 
were approved, in 2014 — 219 deals, in the first 
half of 2015 — 121 merger deals were approved. At 
the same time, the share of transactions which is 
issued together with the instruction constituted in 
2013 — 1 %, in 2014 — 5 %, in the first half of 2015 
— 2 % of total transactions. 
By detailed consideration of selection, it was 
revealed that in 2011, FAS gives information only 
on one decision regarding the coordination of 
M&A deals concerning oil and gas assets; and in 
2012 — for three transactions. At the same time, 
2012 is the period of making the most significant 
transaction by Rosneft which acquired assets of 
TNK-BP. According to KPMG 2 data, in 2012, in an 
2 The market of M&A in Russia in 2012 (2013). Moscow: 
KPMG. Retrieved from: https://www.kpmg.com/RU/ru/
Table 3
Change of administrative barriers in the field of State control on economic integration during 2004–2015*
Before modernization of antitrust legislation After modernization of antitrust law legislation
Threshold values for preliminary coordination of merg-
ers and acquisitions are the following:
the total cost of asset of the commercial organizations 
participating in the merger deal exceeds 3 billion rubles;
their total revenue in a year before the merger deal ex-
ceeded 6 billion rubles; 
one of the parties is included in the register list of the 
companies having a share in the market of certain 
goods in the amount of more than 35 % or holding a 
dominant position in the market
Threshold values for preliminary coordination of mergers and 
acquisitions are the following:
the total cost of asset of the commercial organizations partici-
pating in the merger deal exceeds 7 billion rubles;
their total revenue in a year before the merger deal exceeded 10 
billion rubles;
one of the parties is included in the register list
The merger deals which do not have a significant effect 
on the competition were still under the state control of 
economic concentration
Coordination of each M&A deal is canceled.
Preliminary permission is only for the acquisition of 
voting shares packet as a result of which the buyer can 
control over 20 % of the controlling share package
Initial permission is nessesary only for for acquisition of the 
packet of voting shares as a result of which the buyer can con-
trol over 25 % of the controlling interest
Preliminary permission is necessary if the balance cost 
of property constituting a subject of transaction or the 
interconnected transactions exceeds ten percent of bal-
ance cost of the main production means and intangible 
assets of economic entity making assignment or trans-
fer of property.
This barrier was not codified by low
Preliminary permission is necessary if the balance cost of prop-
erty constituting a subject of transaction or the interconnected 
transactions exceeds twenty percent of balance cost of the main 
production means and intangible assets of economic entity 
making assignment or transfer of property.
A person acquires (a group of persons) more than fifty per-
cent of voting shares of company founded outside the Russian 
Federation territory
* FAS of 2004–2012: Report. (2013). Moscow: Federal antimonopoly service. Retrieved from: http://fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-re-
ports/list-of-reports_30067.html (date of access: 17.07.2015). (In Russ.), pp. 18–19. The federal law «About Protection of the 
Competition» of 26.07.2006 No. 135-FZ (in the editorial office 156-FZ of 29.06.2015).
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oil-and-gas sector, there were made 48 transac-
tions with assets. At the same time, the share of 
10 most significant transactions (except TNK-BP 
assets) constituted 72,3 % of the total number of 
transactions in the oil-and-gas sector. Even if the 
most M&A deals did not need antimonopoly con-
trol, the most significant deals of 2012 concerning 
Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil, must have relevant 
decision in the base of FAS. However, there are no 
such decisions, which shows the data of FAS are 
not as open and availabile. According to experts 
of the All-Russian Public Organization «Business 
Russia», the share of the FAS decisions published 
on the Internet constitutes no more than 5–7 % 
whereas the share of decisions of antimonopoly 
authorities of G7 countries reach 100 %. 1 
The considered selection contained just behav-
ioral instructions among which it was possible to 
select price instructions, instructions about pro-
viding non-discriminatory conditions of agree-
ments, and also about the provision of FAS of 
rapid information about the change in price, re-
leases, and structure of property. But there are no 
any structural instructions, which contain recom-
mendations of FAS of the sale of a part of the busi-
ness. In most cases, the instruction consisted of 
no more than 1–2 paragraphs. Only in three cases, 
the instruction size according to the transaction 
IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/S_
MA_2r%202013.pdf (date of the access 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
1 To a lump and why the 4th anti-monopoly packet is necessary? 
Presentation. (2013). Moscow: All-Russian public organiza-
tion «Business Russia». Retrieved from: http://naiz.org/upload/
iblock/dde/dde09907a174160edaecfe511d17996f.pdf (date of 
access: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
constituted 1–2 pages, and the number of instruc-
tion points varied within five-six. 
On each specific decision, the website of FAS 
shows the summary information about the deal 
with an indication of the structure of deal (the 
number of the acquired shares, shares in the au-
thorized capital, amount of the acquired rights). 
Comparing positive decisions on deals, refusal to 
grant approval of petition, and decisions with in-
struction, we should agree with experts, there are 
too little information in compare with EU infor-
mation (please, see data of experts  2 provided in 
the tab. 4.)
Of course, it is difficult to find the universal 
tool for unmistaken correction of a competitive 
environment after making of a transaction. But at 
the same time, it is necessary to develop work in 
this direction. It is impossible to deny the fact that 
behavioral instructions of 2014 and 2015 began to 
contain more good corrective conditions, than it 
was in 2013, i. e. after acceptance of the first and 
second anti-monopoly packets.
It should be noted that an overwhelming part 
of transactions carried out in the Northwest re-
gion of the Russian Federation during 2000–2005 
did harm the consumer as there was a positive re-
action of the stock exchange on the acquisition of 
national oil and gas assets [24, рp.46–59; 25, pp. 
20–37]. At the same time, the majority of the inte-
gration transactions, which are subject to coordi-
nation in 2006–2015 had no significant effect on 
2 To a lump and why the 4th anti-monopoly packet is necessary? 
Presentation (2013). Moscow: All-Russian public organiza-
tion «Business Russia». Retrieved from: http://naiz.org/upload/
iblock/dde/dde09907a174160edaecfe511d17996f.pdf (date of 
access: 17.07.2016). (In Russ.)
the decisions that the 
transaction isn't subject to 
coordination in Federal 
Antimonopoly Service; 3,21%
the decisions that the 
petition isn't considered 
presented; 0,21%
decisions on the 
petition' refusal; 1,92%decisions with ussue of 
the behavioural 
instruction; 0,64%
decisions on extension 
of term of application; 
5,77%
Fig. 3. Structure of decisions in the sphere of control of market concentration fuel and energy sector (oil and gas assets) during 
2011–2015 (468 decisions)
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the competition as the main repartition of indus-
try assets was completed.
Conclusions
Thus, the comparison and the analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative indices characteriz-
ing the Russian market of crude oil allows to come 
to the following conclusion: the considered goods 
market belongs to the market with insufficiently 
developed competition that is also confirmed by 
the level of profitability of the industry:
— The structure of the Russia oil industry has 
only oligopolistic nature and is characterized by 
the availability of the huge vertically integrated 
oil companies carring out activities on all seg-
ments of the oil market: oil production and oil re-
fining, storage, wholesale, small wholesale and re-
tail sale.
— Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, Gazprom- 
Neft dominate in the crude oil market and oil 
products market having an additional opportunity 
to make a full impact on the main conditions of 
the sale/buy of goods at the Russian oil market. 
The sizes of shares of other vertically integrated 
and multinational companies are subject to mi-
nor changes. The access of new competitors to the 
Russia crude oil market is complicated.
— During the period from 2004 to 2015, for the 
oil industry, the HHI value increased from 1251 to 
1865 units. That demonstrates that the degree of 
the oil market concentration is as close as possible 
to the markets of high concentration. At the same 
time, the calculated value of the CR4 indices in the 
researched period did not exceed 80 %.
— The increased level of oil market concentra-
tion in does not affect the intensity of innovative 
activities of oil and gas companies. 
— The existing level of economic concentra-
tion and companies’ vertical integration availa-
bility determine the main barriers for the profit 
efficiency work at the market of crude oil and oil 
products market. The governmental restrictions 
to enter the oil market are the following: the need 
to obtain licenses, environmental constraints, the 
need to achieve results at the hard geological and 
weather conditions, the use of innovative technol-
ogies access to which is limited. Another barrier 
to entry the market are the limited number of re-
fining facilities and limited capacity to use pipe-
line service of JSC Transneft system, as well as the 
dominancy of Vertically Integrated Oil Companies.
— The sellers in the researched market are the 
oil extraction companies; the buyers — the com-
panies purchasing crude oils for resale or refining 
(the petrochemical and oil processing companies).
— Geographical boundaries of the oil market 
is the territory of the Russian Federation; prod-
uct borders of the the wholesale markets of oil 
products are gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation 
kerosene.
Since 2006, the the FAS antimonopoly control 
of oil industry allowed to create in the Russian 
Federation the commercial infrastructure of the 
oil market, promoted the development of stock ex-
change trading by crude oil and oil goods, and also 
let to register the OTC deals. 
During this research, we have stated and have 
checked the hypothesis of the development of the 
mechanism of corrective conditions in the sphere 
of preliminary control of M&A deals in the fuel 
and energy sector. 
Nowadays, within the system of corrective con-
ditions, FAS uses only official behavioral instruc-
tions. There are no structural instructions with 
the recommendations of antimonopoly authori-
ties on divestment. The presented information on 
the website of FAS concerning decisions-making 
processes in the sphere of market concentration is 
not completed. Many of the M&A deals, which had 
a direct impact on the nature of the competition 
in the industry are not given there. It emphasizes 
that FAS of the Russian Federation has the insuffi-
cient transparency of open data. 
The Russian practice of M&A deals in the oil in-
dustry shows that the majority of the deals of eco-
nomic concentration subject to negotiation have 
no significant influence on the competition. In the 
list of the prohibited merges, there are merges of 
medium business, including those with the par-
ticipation of foreign capital. While large merges, 
for example, purchase of assets of TNK — BP by 
Rosneft is approved by the Russian antimonop-
oly committee. FAS decided to concentrate only 
Table 4
Comparative evaluation of the volumes of information 
presented in decisions of antimonopoly services  
of Russian Federation and the EU
Types of decisions







Permission to M&A 
transaction 1 paragraph 10–70 pages
Permission to M&A 
transaction with 
instructions
1–3 paragraphs 30–100 pages
Refusal of M&A 
transaction 1–3 paragraphs 30–100 pages
The decision on the 
case of violation of 
the antitrust law
Any pages 50–100 pages
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on the giant monopolists and large merges which 
can hold an impact on the competitiveness of the 
Russian oil market. Russia Federal Antimonopoly 
Service can protect consumers by prevention or 
change those mergers, which directly reduce the 
competitiveness of the market. The control of 
mergers by antimonopoly authorities is the basis 
for of the policy competitiveness. It is the unique 
area where the antimonopoly authorities can pre-
vent the transactions capable to harm consumers.
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